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Appellee ELM, Inc. ("ELM"), by and through its counsel of record, Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker, hereby responds, pursuant to the directive of this Court dated
November 20,1998, to the Petition for Rehearing filed by Appellants M.T.
Enterprises, Inc. ("MT") and Morris Told ("Told") (collectively referred to as
"MT") dated November 12, 1998.
INTRODUCTION
MT seeks a rehearing before this Court on the basis that the Court failed to
properly interpret federal law pertaining to the submission of certified reports on
wages paid to individuals working on federal construction projects. M P s
argument purposefully ignores the clear language and express intent of the federal
law and regulations. Secondly, MT ignores the contractual relationship that
existed between MT and ELM and the contractual relationship between MT and
the principal contractor - Comtrol, Inc. MT attempts to fortify the distortion of the
relationship between MT and Comtrol by slipping in unsubstantiated and
unwarranted representations about what Comtrol may or may not have testified to.
Petition for Rehearing at 5. The conclusion made by the Court is correct and
should be reaffirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE AND
REGULATIONS REQUIRES THAT THE WAGE STATEMENT BE
FURNISHED AND EXECUTED BY THE CONTRACTOR OR
SUBCONTRACTOR OR BY ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE.
This Court did not err in concluding that federal law does not impose a duty

upon ELM to provide the required payroll records. In arguing that only an officer
or payroll supervisor of ELM could execute the required wage statements, MT
ignores the plain language of 29 C.F.R. § 3.3(b). That regulation states: "Each
contractor or subcontractor shall furnish each week a statement with respect to
wages paid each of its employees. . .." 29 C.F.R. § 3.3(b) (1998). MT was a
mechanical subcontractor which provided labor and materials for the construction
of the Veterans Administrative Hospital in Salt Lake City. The general contractor
supervising the construction was Comtrol, Inc. ELM was neither the general
contractor nor a subcontractor. MT was the subcontractor which supervised and
directed the on-site workers.
MT entered into an agreement with ELM whereby ELM would be
responsible for paying MT's workers and performing other related administrative
matters (e.g., payment of benefits, etc.). ELM had no responsibility for the actual
work performed by the workers; that responsibility remained with MT. ELM was
2

responsible for paying the workers and MT was responsible for supervising the
workers. In essence, the MT workers on the Veterans Administrative Hospital
project had two employers: MT with respect to the actual vi«>i l ..uuJ 111 M wMh
respect I,, ., «nii|K.feii: iilion lor lilt* vv niL
\n employee of one person can become the employee of another person
alternately, simultaneously, wholly, or partially." 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Employment
Relationship. §6 (1996). Unfortunately, the federal statute and regulations at issue
do not define the term "employee, IKM does any ease l.ivv shed li^hl run (In: issue.
i knvever,, 2() (' F R § 3,2 does pmvide ptudciiitv It states in subsection (e):
Every person paid by a contractor or subcontractor in any
manner for his labor in the construction, prosecution,
completion, or repair of a public building or public work or
building or work financed in whole or in part by loans or grants
from the United States is "employed" and receiving "wages"
regardless of any contractual relationship alleged to exist
between him and the real employer.
2() I' ¥ R § 1 ?. i| e) 110()S I (emphasis added). This section acknowledges that an
employee can have more than one employer. Even though ELM ultimately issued
the checks to the laborers, those laborers were nonetheless employees of MT
because they received payment by means of; :.
specifically,] . , «-;-* -

•

^,. :..
benefit*-

< .nice,

iiiiil workers' compensation in exchange for 112.50% of the gross payroll ELM
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paid the leased employees. Under the contractual arrangement, MT paid ELM
which then paid the laborers. Therefore, the money used to pay the laborers
originated with MT. According to 29 C.F.R. § 3.2(e), MT was an employer.
MT states that the laborers were ELM's employees "and only ELM's
employees." The facts clearly show that even if the laborers were employees of
ELM, they were also employees of MT, thereby creating a dual employment
relationship. While the laborers were working, they were under the direct
supervision and control of MT, not ELM. It was MT that told the laborers what to
do and had the authority to terminate their employment if their work was
unsatisfactory. It was MT that had the direct knowledge of who was working, the
hours that were being worked, and the work that was being done. It is only logical
that MT should have been the one to submit the wage statements as it had the most
direct knowledge of the facts necessary to complete them. Furthermore, ELM had
to obtain from MT the information necessary to pay the laborer, such as number of
hours worked, overtime, sick pay, etc.
In conclusion, the laborers at issue were clearly employees of MT.
According to the plain language of the regulations, it is the contractor or
subcontractor (i.e., MT) that must provide the wage statements of its employees.
MT, not ELM, was responsible for providing those statements unless MT made
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arrangements for ELM to prepare and submit certified payrolls, which MT did not
do. See Opinion at 5. This Court therefore, should affirm its original decision
holding that ELM had no duty to complete the wage statements, and refuse to grant
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing.
II.

MT PERSISTS IN INTRODUCING UNSUBSTANTIATED
STATEMENTS AND ALLEGATIONS THAT ARE NOT PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT RECORD.
This Court has been very charitable to MT when it described the federal law

issue discussed above as having been "raised rather obliquely". Opinion at 5. At
the time of trial, MT's counsel never provided a copy of the federal statute that
ELM supposedly offended. Throughout the briefing to this Court, MT failed to
provide a single reference to any statutory provision that might have created such a
duty to provide certified payrolls. It was not until the oral argument before this
Court that counsel for MT gifted the Court and opposing counsel with a reference
to the law that supposedly created the obligation for ELM.
In order to resolve any ambiguity or question about the matter, this Court
generously "examined federal statutes and regulations not previously provided by
M.T. to either the trial court of this court." Opinion at 6. MT takes issue in MT's
Petition for Rehearing with the conclusion reached by the Court. In its effort to
divert the Court's attention from the plain language of the statutes and regulations,
5

MT refers to facts and allegations that simply never appear in the record. More
specifically, MT states:
It was for this reason that Comtrol would not allow MT to execute certified
payrolls for ELM" employees. Comtrol would only accept payroll
statements which had been executed by an officer of ELM, or by the
employee of ELM who "supervised[d] the payment" by ELM "of wages" to
the ELM employees which MT leased.
Petition for Rehearing at 5.
No one from Comtrol ever testified at the trial. No affidavits or declarations
from Comtrol were ever offered into evidence at any stage of the litigation in the
trial court. No one from Comtrol ever gave a deposition in this matter. Quite
simply, there is no testimony or evidence from anyone at Comtrol.
MT now wants this Court to countenance these unsubstantiated allegations
in a Petition for Rehearing. MT wants this Court to believe that the third party
general contractor on the VA Hospital project somehow communicated to MT that
Comtrol would not accept the certified payrolls if executed by MT rather than
ELM. MT has waived its opportunity to offer such testimony when it failed to
introduce such evidence at the time of trial. To even consider this argument
concerning the alleged rejection of the certified payrolls by Comtrol is to sanction
MT's presentation of a moving target for the Court's consideration. The time and
place for such evidence was at trial. MT failed to provide such evidence, and it
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shouldn't be allowed to subvert the appellate process by referring to such
allegations now. ELM needs to have this matter brought to a close.
SUMMARY
MT's Petition for Rehearing should be denied because it has not offered a
plausible interpretation of the pertinent statutes that might require ELM to provide
certified payrolls. Secondly, the Court should reject any unsubstantiated
allegations concerning the acceptance or rejection of certified payrolls by Comtrol.
DATED this /(

day of December, 1998.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Jonn P. Harrington
^^^
Attorneys for Appellee ELM, Inc.
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